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Introduction: 
Designing control and enforcement strategies in the fisheries sector to ensure 
compliance with existing rules is intricate and often hampered by costs. 
The EU Sixth Framework Programme Project “Costs and benefits of Control Strategies” 
(COBECOS; https://cobecos.jrc.ec.europa.eu) tackled this impediment to successful 
fisheries control and enforcement schemes by developing computer based modelling 
approaches which help to optimise the cost/benefit ratio of envisioned 
control/enforcement strategies. 
This modelling framework is based on theory and empirical estimations aimed at 
answering questions such as: 
 What are the costs and benefits of increased enforcement effort in particular 
fisheries? 
 If compliance alters (exogenously) in certain fisheries what are the costs and 
benefits?  
 What are the impacts of increased penalties for violations of fisheries rules? 
 How do different control schemes compare when the cost of enforcement is 
taken into account? 
In order to test COBECOS using real scenarios, the Joint Research Centre in 
collaboration with the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM), 
applied the COBECOS model to a selection of Swedish fisheries. One of the main 
deliverables of this project (lacking in the  FP6 COBECOS) has been the production of a 
fully functioning user friendly software. This open source software allows the user to 
investigate the costs and the benefits of enforcement tools of various fisheries and 
management situations. It includes default functions but it is flexible enough to allow 
the user to introduce their own estimations, modify the parameters etc. if so wanted. 
Results and deliverables are documented in this report.  
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Preface 
According to the Swedish COBECOS pilot study contractual obligations, a report on 
providing a thorough description of enforcement variables for the specific COEBCOS 
fisheries in the form of tabulated data, should be made available as a deliverable (D1) 
in month 9. The following report and data tables constitute the fulfilment of this 
obligation.  
Gothenburg 28 November 2012 
For the contractor in the Swedish COBECOS Pilot Study,  
Jenny Nord  
  
Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM) 
Gothenburg (Sweden) 
 
Swedish COBECOS Pilot Study  
Deliverable 1 
Description of enforcement variables 
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1. Background 
 
This report describes the data submitted to JRC in Excel files. The data concerns the 
two Swedish fisheries COBECOS 1 W referring to demersal trawlers on the west coast 
and COBECOS 2 E referring to cod trawlers in the Baltic Sea. In addition, in order to 
provide the full picture of Swedish fisheries some descriptive data of the entire 
Swedish fishing fleet have been submitted.  
 
2. Definitions 
 
Fisheries  
The fisheries have been defined based on the gear types included in the management 
plans for cod (Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007  and 1342/2008).   
Gear code Gear name Gear number 
(>= 90 mm) 
COBECOS 1 W  
(ICES 27.IIIa, IV) 
COBECOS 1 E  
 (ICES 27.IIIbcd) 
SDN  Danish seiners 221   1 1 
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 300  1  
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 309  1  
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 310  1  
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 312  1 1 
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 319  1 1 
PTB  Pair trawl bottom 320  1 1 
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 330  1 1 
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 331  1  
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 332  1  
OTB  Otter trawl bottom 333  1  
PTB  Pair trawl bottom 334  1  
OTM  Otter trawl midwater 323   1 
OTM  Otter trawl midwater 324   1 
Enforcement tools  
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Data on landings and administrative controls are provided. At the planning stage the 
model was foreseen to also include data on sea going controls. However, during the 
data collection it became apparent that there were no infringements at sea for the 
vessels of the two COBECOS segments in the last three years. Hence, sea-going control 
could not be included in the COBECOS model.   
 
The data concerning landings controls concern Swedish fishing vessels landing in 
Swedish ports.  A large part of the Swedish fleet is landing in Denmark but since we do 
not have enough information on enforcement activities in Denmark, fishing trips with 
landings in other countries than Sweden has been excluded.   
 
A landing control is defined as the period between when the inspectors leave and 
return to the control station. Hence, both costs for travelling as well as for the actual 
control are included.  
Administrative controls are defined as all verification made of incoming logbook sheets. 
Administrative controls have been carried out for all fishing trips disregarding the 
country of landing.  
 
Infringement types 
 
The vessels of the two segments could commit infringements of more than 20 fisheries 
rules. In order to ensure more observations per infringement type and to avoid having 
to estimate a vast number of probability functions the infringements have been group 
into four categories: 
 
1. Logbook errors 
2. Prenotification failures or delays 
3. Other administrative sanctions 
4. Court cases 
 
3. Data 
 
The data is provided in Excel form. In order to facilitate for the navigation of data sets, 
a data guide has been provided (“Data guide for JRC”). Here type, aggregation level, 
time period and name of the files are described.  In addition, the guide is organised in a 
way that it becomes clear which data file should be used for each function. 
 
4. Enquiries  
 
Any questions of the data or the on-going work within the project can be addressed to: 
 
Malin Hultgren: 
malin.hultgren@havochvatten.se 
0046 10 698 62 47 
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Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM) 
Gothenburg (Sweden) 
 
Swedish COBECOS Pilot Study 
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Estimation 
Project Responsible: Jenny Nord 
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Disclaimer  
This report has been prepared under contract ICEEF Service Contract Nr. 
257233 by the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
(SwAM), Gothenburg (Sweden). It does not necessarily reflect the view of 
the European Commission and in no way anticipates the Commission’s 
future policy in this area. 
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Preface 
 
According to the Swedish COBECOS pilot study contractual obligations, a report of 
assessment of estimations should be made available as a deliverable (D2) in month 12. 
The following report constitutes the fulfilment of this obligation.  
 
The report is conducted in three parts:  
 
1) Assessment of estimates of theoretical enforcement relationships. 
2) Method for estimating the shadow value 
3) Extension of the theory to include administrative and newer control tools.  
 
In addition to the contractual obligations SwAM is also delivering two R- models of the 
two fisheries.  
 
Gothenburg 18 March 2013 
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PART 1 Assessment of estimates of theoretical enforcement 
relationships. 
1. Background  
Fisheries  
 The fisheries have been defined based on the gear types included in the 
management plans for cod (Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 and (EC) 
1342/2008).   
 
Table 1.  Gear definitions 
Gear code Gear name Gear identification 
(>= 90 mm) 
COBECOS 1 W  
(ICES 27.IIIa, IV) 
COBECOS 1 E  
 (ICES 27.IIIbcd) 
SDN Danish seiners 221 1 1 
OTB Otter trawl bottom 300 1  
OTB Otter trawl bottom 309 1  
OTB Otter trawl bottom 310 1  
OTB Otter trawl bottom 312 1 1 
OTB Otter trawl bottom 319 1 1 
PTB Pair trawl bottom 320 1 1 
OTB Otter trawl bottom 330 1 1 
OTB Otter trawl bottom 331 1  
OTB Otter trawl bottom 332 1  
OTB Otter trawl bottom 333 1  
PTB Pair trawl bottom 334 1  
OTM Otter trawl midwater 323  1 
OTM Otter trawl midwater 324 1 1 
 
Enforcement tools  
Data on landings and administrative controls are provided. At the planning stage of the 
project the model was foreseen to also include data on sea going controls. However, 
during the data collection it became apparent that there were a very limited number of 
infringements at sea for the vessels of the two COBECOS fisheries in the last three 
years. Hence, sea-going control could not be included in the COBECOS model.   
 
The data regarding landings controls concern Swedish fishing vessels landing in 
Swedish ports.  A large part of the Swedish fleet is in fact landing abroad, in Denmark 
etc. However, there is currently not sufficient information for vessels landing abroad 
and fishing trips with landings in other countries than Sweden has been excluded.   
 
A landing control is defined as the period between when the inspectors leave and 
return to the control station. Hence, costs for travelling as well as for the actual control 
are included.  
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Administrative controls are defined as all verification in logbooks regarding quantity 
and geographical position. Administrative controls have been carried out for all fishing 
trips disregarding the place of landing.  
 
Infringement types 
The vessels of the two COBECOS fisheries operate under more than 20 fisheries rules. 
In order to ensure more observations per infringement type and to avoid having to 
estimate a vast number of probability functions the infringements have been group 
into four categories: 
 
1. Logbook errors 
2. Prenotification failures or delays 
3. Other administrative sanctions 
4.  Court cases 
 
Since the COBECOS theory is built around detected infringements, the number of 
detected infringements is crucial for the outcome of the model. For the two Swedish 
fisheries chosen for analysis the number of detected infringements within the period 
was limited. 
2. The model  
In the estimation work SwAM decided to go further than indicated in the contract and 
develop a model in R of the two Swedish fisheries. The model is constructed according 
to the below illustration:  
 
The script of the model is delivered in a separate document accompanying this report.   
 
Considering that the COBECOS model was developed as a tool for managers and 
enforcement officers the aim of the Swedish modelling efforts was to build a model as 
simple and user-friendly as possible.  
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3. Estimation  
In order to calculate the social benefits of the landings and administrative control 
activities the following five functional forms or estimates has been calculated:  
o The probability of penalty function 
o The enforcement cost function  
o The penalty function  
o The private benefit function  
o The social benefit function  
1.1 3.1 The probability of penalty function  
 The probability for the fisher to receive a penalty when violating depends on a 
number of factors such as the type of management measure and type of enforcement 
tools. In addition, a number of social factors such as peer pressure and the general 
compliance level in the country are driving factors of the probability of detection.  Due 
to modelling difficulties of social factors only factors that are given in monetary terms 
or that can be translated into monetary terms (penalties, withdrawal of license etc.) 
are included as drivers of compliance in the COBECOS model.  
 In the COBECOS model, the probability of penalty function is defined as the 
probability of receiving a sanction if violating a management measure.  
V) (S)( pe 
 
 A fair assumption is made stating that all detected infringements are 
sanctioned. That is:  
1C)V (S)(  pe
 
 The probability of penalty is assumed to increase with the intensity of employed 
enforcement effort (e), i.e. number of controls in a given year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
The penalty probablity function 
 
 
(e)
e
1
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 In a scenario where all fishing activity is controlled it is thought that all or close 
to all infringements of the particular management tool will be detected. Hence, 
1 (e)Max 
 
 There were very few detected and sanctioned infringements in the two fisheries 
(see table 2 below). Hence, there were not enough observations to estimate the 
relationship between enforcement effort and the probability of detection.   
Table 2. Number of sanctions 
 
2009 2010 2011 
Fisheries Admin.  Landings Admin.  At sea  Landings Admin.  Landings 
Cobecos 1 W 27 5 8 1 8 13 1 
Cobecos 2 E 10 2 - - 3 3 5 
To construct the model a set of different theoretical functional forms was tested. These 
are illustrated below. 
 
Example ‘Exponential’ curves with different parameter values, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 5.0: 
p = (1.0 - exp(-curveParam*e)) / (1 - exp(-curveParam)) 
 
 
Example ‘tanh’ curves with different parameter values 2, 3, 4, 6: 
p = tanh(curveParam * (e - 0.5)) / tanh(curveParam * 0.5) 
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The parameter values indicated with a box are used in the model.  
1.2 3.2. The enforcement cost function 
 The two enforcement types included in the model generate two different cost 
functions: 
Cl= cost per landings control 
C2= cost per administrative control 
3.2.1 Landings control 
 The cost per control is defined as all costs associated with preparation, 
travelling to the control location, inspection and legal costs in the case infringements 
were detected. The data collection was exhaustive and the cost per landings control 
can be described as below:   
Cost per control (cl) = cinspector 
(tpreparation+tadmin+2tinspection+2ttravel)+2(ctravel*cinspector)+clegal+cvariable 
cinspector = Wage per hour (including social costs).  
tpreparation= Preparation time per inspection. 
tadmin= Time for administration per inspection 
tinspection= Time per inspection 
ttravel = travel time from control office to the inspection site.  
ctravel = travelling cost (cost of cars and fuel) 
clegal= legal cost per control (calculated from the legal cost per infringement)  
cvariable = variable costs 
 
 The cost per control is inserted as a cost parameter in the model.  
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3.2.2 Administrative control  
 The cost per control is associated with all costs verifying catch quantity and 
geographical position.  
Cost per administrative control (C2) = cinspector*(tinspection + tadmin  +tpreparation) 
+clegal*tinfringement 
cinspector = wage per hour (including social costs).  
tpreparation= preparation time per inspection. 
tadmin= time for administration per inspection 
tinspection= time per inspection 
clegal= legal cost per inspection (calculated from the legal cost per infringement)  
tinfringement = time for legal expert per inspection (calculated from the legal time per 
infringement) 
3.3 Penalty function 
 According to the COBECOS theory a penalty function that illustrates how the 
penalty changes with the level of infringement should be estimated. Sweden has two 
legal systems for fisheries offences, criminal and administrative sanctions. There were 
too few criminal sanctions to include these in the model for the two fisheries 
Therefore, only administrative sanctions are included. The level of theses sanctions are 
fixed in accordance with national legislation and not dependent on the level of 
infringements. For this reason a penalty parameter was used in the model.   
3.4 Private benefit function   
 In the COBECOS theory it is assumed that the fisher will fish up to the point, 
legally or illegally, that maximises the private benefit. The private benefit function can 
take various forms. SwAM has for the sake of simplicity, chosen to use the function 
given in the COBECOS theory:  
 
PB(f,x) = p*q – cf*cadj *q
2/x               
p= price 
q= catch 
cf =fishing cost   
cadj = cost adjustment factor  
x = the biomass 
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The derivative shows that there is a marginal stock effect, i.e. that CPUE increased with 
the size of the biomass.  
 
3.4. Shadow value  
 Based on the data available the shadow value could not be assessed. For 
modelling purposes a “guesstimate” was used.  
3.5. Social benefits   
 The following model was used to calculate the Social benefit function.  
 
SB = (p-λ) *q - cadj * cf  *(q
2 –ce)/x        
P= price 
λ = shadow value of biomass 
q = catch 
cadj = cost adjustment factor  
cf = fishing costs  
ce = control cost  
 
 Concluding remarks  
 The number of infringements coupled with the very low penalty level for the 
infringements carried out prevented SwAM to run the COBECOS model successfully 
with empirical data. In order to make it run some adjustment factors had to be 
included. These are given in detail in the script of the R model.  
 Efforts have been made to design a simulation tool. With the anticipation of 
being used as inspiration for future work, an illustration of the tool is included in the 
deliverables.  
 
 
 
  
 Tender specifications IPSC/2011104/07/NC | Service Contract No. 257233 | Final Report 19 of 75 
 
PART 2 Assessment of estimates of theoretical 
enforcement relationships. 
 On January 13, 2012, I contracted with the Swedish Agency for Marine and 
Water Management (SwAM) to assist in a pilot study for applying the COBECOS 
fisheries enforcement methodology. This report constitutes a partial fulfilment of my 
obligations under this contract, namely item 3.c of the contract. 
 
 
Reykjavik 29. April 2012 
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1. Cobecos enforcement theory: A brief review 
 The following summarizes the essentials of the fisheries enforcement theory as 
outlined in the Cobecos project (COBECOS 2009). The term “essentials” is used because 
the presentation ignores the numerous details of any actual enforcement situation. It 
should be noted that this theory is not limited to fisheries but covers essentially any 
centralized enforcement situation. 
 Faced with a binding harvest constraint, q*, a fisher is assumed to have the 
following expected benefit function: 
(1) ( , ) ( ) ( *)B q x e f q q    , 
 where the variables q, x and e refer to the volume of harvest, the size of the 
biomass and enforcement effort, respectively. The function B(q, x) measures the 
private benefits (profits and/or utility) the fisher gains from fishing. This naturally 
depends both on the level of harvest, q, and (positively) on the level of biomass, x. The 
second term in (1) represents his expected costs of violating the harvest constraint. The 
difference (q-q*), which is nonnegative since the constraint is supposed to be binding 
(the other case is not of interest) is the level of infraction. The parameter f  is the 
penalty for a unit of infraction and the function ( )e  measures the probability of 
having to pay that penalty. This of course is monotonically increasing in the 
enforcement effort, e. 1 
 Maximizing these benefits with respect to the harvest volume yields the 
enforcement response function:  
(2) ( , , , *)q Q e x f q . 
  
 Since (2) assumes fishers have maximized their benefits (implies the function 
B(q,x) is concave), the first derivatives of the enforcement response function, Qe and Qf 
are negative. If also Bqx is positive, which seems very likely, then Qx is positive.  
 The enforcement problem is to select the path of enforcement effort, {e}, over 
time such that the present value of private benefits less enforcement costs are 
maximized subject to the relevant constraints of the problem. Formally:  
(I)  
0
 ( , ) - ( )
{ }
T
r tMax B q x C e e dt
e
   
  
                                                     
1
  The probability and penalty functions in (1) may of course be made more general. E.g. the 
separable expression f(q-q*) could more generally be written as the increasing function f(q-q*).  
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Subject to:  q = Q(e, f, x, q*), 
  ( )x G x q  , 
 where G(x) is the natural biomass growth function and C(e) is the enforcement 
cost function. The term r te   is the discount factor with r being the rate of discount. 
The upper limit of the integral, T, is the terminal time which may be infinite. Obviously 
this problem includes as a sub-problem the selection of enforcement effort at the 
current time. In what follows, (I) will be referred to as the Basic enforcement problem.  
 The enforcement problem (I) may (but does not have to) be restated in the very 
convenient form: 
(II)  ( ( , , , *), ) - ( ) ( ( ) ( , , , *))Max B Q e f x q x C e G x Q e f x q
e
   , 
 where  is the shadow value of biomass. It is worth noting that the rule 
expressed in (II) is really the Maximum Principle of dynamic maximization theory made 
famous by Pontryagin and his collaborators (1962). Note also that (II) is merely a 
particular restatement of the Basic Enforcement Problem.  
 In the COBECOS theory, the shadow value of biomass, , and biomass, x, were 
taken to be exogenous data and suggested that current enforcement effort be adjusted 
to maximize (II). Assuming sufficient smoothness and an interior solution, the solution 
to this problem is expressed by: 
(4) ( ( ( , , , *), ) ) ( , , , *) ( )q e eB Q e f x q x Q e f x q C e   . 
 So, according to this, to be able to carry out optimal enforcement, the 
enforcement agency has to know the following2:  
1. The fishers’ private benefit function, B(q,x). 
2. The probability of penalty function, ( )e . 
3. The cost of enforcement function, C(e) 
4. The level of biomass, x 
5. The penalty parameter, f  
6. The shadow value of biomass,  
 This paper is concerned with how to obtain numerical estimates of  assuming 
knowledge of the other items of knowledge.  
 
                                                     
2 Note that the fishers’ enforcement response function, ( , , )Q e x f , can be derived on the basis of 1, 2 
and 4. 
 Tender specifications IPSC/2011104/07/NC | Service Contract No. 257233 | Final Report 22 of 75 
 
1.1 It is not strictly necessary to know  
 Since this paper is concerned with finding practical ways to estimate , it should 
be mentioned that it is not strictly necessary to include  in the enforcement problem. 
 is included in the restatement of the Basic enforcement problem in (II) merely 
because it is convenient, which is the same reason it is included in maximization 
problems in general. It is possible to restate the Basic enforcement problem in forms 
that do not involve . One such variant is the calculus of variations version of the basic 
enforcement problem (I) 
(IIb)  ( ( ( , , ), , ), ) ( ( , , )Max B Q E x x f f x x C E x x f , 
 
 where the role of enforcement effort, e, is played by the expression ( , , )E x x f  
derived from the dynamic constraint ( ) ( , , )x G x Q e f x  .3 Solving (IIb) yields an 
optimal path for x and, therefore, also x . Given this, the optimal enforcement at each 
point of time can be obtained from ( ) ( , , )x G x Q e f x  . 
 While (IIb) avoids the explicit use of , this is at the cost of a much more 
complicated expression and a certain reduction in transparency. It should be noted that 
 has not really disappeared from the problem. In (IIb) its role is simply played by other 
expressions. Thus, the problem of estimating  in (II) is simply replaced by the problem 
of obtaining and working with more complicated expressions in (IIb). 
 
2. The shadow value of biomass 
 In this section, the theory of shadow prices is briefly discussed. This is useful for 
understanding the proposed method to estimate these prices in section 3 below.  
2.1 The general theory of shadow values 
 The basic enforcement problem is but a special case of the general optimal-
control problem (see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz 1981) 
(III) 
0{ ( )}
 ( ( ), ( ), )
T
u t
Maximize J I x t u t t  dt + F(x(T),T) 
  þ.a. x = f(x(t),u(t),t), 
x(0) = x0, 
u(t)U, all t. 
 
                                                     
3
  There are certain technical difficulties with the expression ( , , )E x x f . For instance, it does not 
strictly exist as a function over the whole range of positive x.  
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 In this formulation the function I(x(t),u(t),t) is the objective function, the 
function F(x(T),T) the terminal function and the function f(x(t),u(t),t) the function of 
motion. The control variables are denoted u(t) and x(t) represents the state variables. U 
denotes the set from which the control variables may be selected.  
 Now assume problem (III) has been solved. That yields a certain value of the 
functional J which depends on all the data of the problem. Write this as: 
 *( (0); , , )J x T r U . 
 Given this maximum value, the shadow value of the state variables measures 
the marginal benefits of an increase in the initial level of the respective state variables, 
x(0) (see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz 1981). Thus, the shadow value of state variable i is 
defined as:  
(5) 
*( (0); , , )
*( )
(0; )
J x T r U
i
x i




. 
 It is well-know that these mathematical shadow values correspond exactly to 
perfect market prices (see e.g. Dorfman 1969, Kamien and Schwartz 1981, Dixit 1990).  
 The existence of shadow prices does not depend on the optimal solution to the 
problem (III). Let u(x,t) represent any rule for the control variable u. Given this feed-
back rule, and other particulars of the problem, a certain value for the functional J is 
defined. Write this as the constrained value function: 
 ( (0); , , )J x T r U . 
 Then the shadow value of state variable i given this particular control rule is 
defined exactly as in (5)  
(6) 
( (0); , , )
( )
(0; )
J x T r U
i
x i




. 
 This shadow value, however, will generally be different from the one 
corresponding to the optimal policy and defined in (5). For the same level of initial 
biomass, it will normally be lower. The reason is that normally the optimal policy will 
make better use of additional biomass. This, however, does not have to be the case in 
general.  
 It is useful to note that if x is beneficial the value function J will be an increasing 
function of x(0). In those cases,  will be positive. Moreover, J will often be a concave 
function of x(0). This applies for instance if there are diminishing marginal returns (to 
utility or production) which is a common rule in economics. In those cases,  will be a 
declining function of x(0). Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the shadow values of a 
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beneficial state variable x for the optimal and constrained case under these 
assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Fisheries: Shadow value of biomass 
 For fisheries the above theory of shadow values carries through in a straight-
forward manner. Consider for instance the fisheries problem  
(IV) 
0
 ( , )
{ }
r tMax V B q x e dt
q

    
 Subject to: ( )x G x q  , 
  x(0) given 
 Assume some rule for the level of fishing, i.e. a fisheries feed-back rule. Write 
this rule as:  
(7) q=Q(x;r).  
 This rule is perfectly general. It depends on all the data of the problem and can 
take any form as long as it is a function. It may be the solution to the dynamic 
maximization problem or some other rule. It may be regarded as simply any fishing 
policy or harvesting rule. 
 
Figure 1 
Typical shapes of shadow values: Unconstrained (*) and constrained 
()  
 
x
 *

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 Substituting the feed-back rule into the differential equation and solving it 
yields the biomass path {x} as a function of the initial biomass x(0). Substituting that 
path into the integral yields the value function V(x(0);r). On that basis the shadow value 
of biomass can be calculated as:  
(8) 
( (0); )
(0)
V x r
x




. 
 This shadow value will in general have the same shape as illustrated in Figure 1.  
It is important to note the following: 
1. The shadow value depends on not only on biomass, which is endogenous to the 
fishery, but all the other parameters of the problem. These include: 
a. the rate of discount, r,  
b. prices which are not explicitly represented in (7)  
c. the fisheries feed-back rule, Q(x;r) which is also not explicit in (7) and 
d. the fisheries management system not explicit in (7) 
2. If the value function is low, for instance because of an inefficient fisheries 
management system, shadow of biomass will be low.  
 
To calculate the value of (8), it is obviously necessary to: 
1. Obtain the feed-back rule Q(x;r) (This may involve solving the maximization 
problem). 
2. Calculate the integral V to obtain the maximum value function V(x(0);r) 
3. Perform the differentiation in (7). This may of course be approximated by 
( (0); ) ( (0) ; ) ( (0); )V x r V x r V x r
x



  
 

, where  is some small addition to 
the biomass. 
 
2.3 The shadow value under fisheries enforcement 
 Fisheries enforcement theory shows that the shadow value of the biomass 
depends not primarily on the fishing policy (harvesting rule) but the level of 
enforcement (COBECOS 2009). In other words, a more appropriate formulation of the 
fisheries problem than (IV) is problem (I) as stated in the review of the COBECOS theory 
in section 1.  
(I)  
0
 ( , ) - ( )
{ }
T
r tMax B q x C e e dt
e
   
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Subject to:  q = Q(e,f,x,q*), 
  ( )x G x q  , 
  x(0) given 
 So in this, more realistic fisheries management, the proper control variable is 
fisheries enforcement rather than the level of harvesting.  
 The same general principles carry through. Any policy for enforcement can be 
written as the enforcement feed-back rule:  
(9) e = E(x;r,f,q*). 
 Note that the only endogenous variable in this formulation is the biomass level, 
x. All the other arguments in (9) are parameters, i.e. exogenous constants.  
 Substituting (9) into problem (I) and solving it leads to the value function 
V(x(0);r,f,q*). On that basis, the shadow value can be calculated as: 
(10) 
( (0); , , *)
(0)
V x r f q
x




, 
And this shadow value can be approximated in the same way as before, namely as:  
(11) 
( (0); , , *) ( (0) ; , , *) ( (0); , , *)
(0)
V x r f q V x r f q V x r f q
x



  
 

 
 To calculate this shadow value, therefore, it is necessary to have an estimate of 
the value function, V(x(0);r,f,q*). To obtain that function it is necessary to have the 
following information. 
1. The fishers’ private benefit function, B(q,x). 
2. The probability of penalty function, ( )e . 
3. The cost of enforcement function, C(e) 
4. The enforcement response function, q = Q(e,f,x,q*). This may be derived from 
the other data. 
5. The enforcement feed-back rule, e = E(x;r,f,q*) 
6. The current level of biomass, x 
7. The penalty parameter, f  
8. The rate of discount, r 
9. The various prices entering the cost and benefit functions and therefore also 
the enforcement response function and possibly the enforcement feed-back 
rule.   
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2.4 A note on the endogeneity of  
 The shadow value of biomass, , is fundamentally endogenous in the 
enforcement problem as well as other control problems. In the COBECOS theory (see 
section 1 and, in particular rule (II)), the optimal enforcement effort at each point of 
time depends on the number used for the shadow value of biomass. The enforcement 
picked, leads to a specific value function which as described in (8) and (10) defines the 
shadow value of biomass.  
 Thus, ideally, the optimal effort level and the shadow value of biomass should 
be determined simultaneously. Indeed this is the procedure in theoretical optimization 
theory (Kamien and Schwartz 1981, Dixit 1990).  
3. Theoretically consistent optimal enforcement 
 The dynamic enforcement problem is to select a path of enforcement effort, {e}, 
that maximizes the present value of net benefits from the fishery. Formally: 
(V)  
0{ }
 ( ( , ; , *), ) ( ) r t
e
Max V B Q e x f q x C e e dt

    .  
Subject to: ( ) ( , ; , *)x G x Q e x f q  , 
 x(0), given. 
Where all the functions and variables have been defined above.  
 
The Hamiltonian appropriate to this problem may be written as: 
(11)  ( ( , ; , *), ) ( ) ( ( ) ( , ; , *))H B Q e x f q x C e G x Q e x f q     ,  
where  represents the shadow value of biomass. 
 Necessary conditions for solving this problem include (Pontryagin et al. 1962, 
Kamien and Schwartz 1981):  
(11.1) e should maximize H, all t. (Pontryagin’s maximum principle)  
( ) ,q e eB Q C    all t 
(11.2) ( )q x x x xr B Q B G Q           , all t. 
(11.3) ( ) ( , ; , *)x G x Q e x f q  , all t 
(11.4) x(0)= the x(0) that is given.  
(11.5) An appropriate transversality condition.  
 Solving (11.1)-(11.5) together yields the optimal paths of enforcement, biomass 
and shadow value of biomass over time. While this is theoretically sound, this joint 
solution is computationally quite demanding and therefore not very practical.  
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The COBECOS theory attempts to provide a practical approximate solution to the 
enforcement problem. How does the COBECOS approach compare to the theoretically 
consistent solution defined by (11.1)-(11.5) above.  
 First note that the Hamilton function (11) is identical to the function in the Basic 
Enforcement Problem in (II) above.  
 Second, note that the Basic Enforcement Problem as stated in (II) is exactly 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle (Pontryagin et al. 1962). Indeed the necessary 
condition (11.1) confirms the COBECOS solution to the enforcement problem as 
expressed by equation (4). Thus, dynamic optimization theory confirms that rule 
as being dynamically correct.  
 Third, note that under the COBECOS theory necessary conditions (11.3) and 
(11.4) will be automatically satisfied (facts of life). 
 Fourth, the COBECOS theory ignores conditions (11.3) and (11.5), that is the 
dynamic evolution of the shadow value of biomass. Instead the COBECOS 
theory takes the current  simply as a given datum.  
  
 Thus, the COBECOS theory deviates from the theoretical ideal by taking  as 
given. Note, however, that from a practical perspective this is not much of an error. 
The reason is that in applying the COBECOS theory, enforcement effort is set at a point 
of time (or rather for a period such as a year) and not for the whole future. At this point 
of time, , is for the most part given as a function of future expectations for the fishery 
partly expressed by the enforcement feed-back rule as discussed above. Thus, 
whatever is done during the first period is not going to alter  drastically, especially if 
enforcement effort is set optimally.  
4. Theoretically consistent optimal enforcement 
 The dynamic enforcement problem is to select a path of enforcement effort, {e}, 
that maximizes the present value of net benefits from the fishery. Formally: 
(V)  
0{ }
 ( ( , ; , *), ) ( ) r t
e
Max V B Q e x f q x C e e dt

    .  
Subject to: ( ) ( , ; , *)x G x Q e x f q  , 
 x(0), given. 
Where all the functions and variables have been defined above.  
 
The Hamiltonian appropriate to this problem may be written as: 
(11)  ( ( , ; , *), ) ( ) ( ( ) ( , ; , *))H B Q e x f q x C e G x Q e x f q     ,  
where  represents the shadow value of biomass. 
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Necessary conditions for solving this problem include (Pontryagin et al. 1962, Kamien 
and Schwartz 1981):  
(11.1) e should maximize H, all t. (Pontryagin’s maximum principle)  
( ) ,q e eB Q C    all t 
(11.2) ( )q x x x xr B Q B G Q           , all t. 
(11.3) ( ) ( , ; , *)x G x Q e x f q  , all t 
(11.4) x(0) = the x(0) that is given.  
(11.5) An appropriate transversality condition.  
 Solving (11.1)-(11.5) together yields the optimal paths of enforcement, biomass 
and shadow value of biomass over time. While this is theoretically sound, this joint 
solution is computationally quite demanding and therefore not very practical.  
 The COBECOS theory attempts to provide a practical approximate solution to 
the enforcement problem. How does the COBECOS approach compare to the 
theoretically consistent solution defined by (11.1)-(11.5) above? 
 First note that the Hamilton function (11) is identical to the function in the Basic 
Enforcement Problem in (II) above.  
 Second, note that the Basic Enforcement Problem as stated in (II) is exactly 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle (Pontryagin et al. 1962). Indeed the necessary 
condition (11.1) confirms the COBECOS solution to the enforcement problem as 
expressed by equation (4). Thus, dynamic optimization theory confirms that rule 
as being dynamically correct.  
 Third, note that under the COBECOS theory necessary conditions (11.3) and 
(11.4) will be automatically satisfied (facts of life). 
 Fourth, the COBECOS theory ignores conditions (11.3) and (11.5), that is the 
dynamic evolution of the shadow value of biomass. Instead the COBECOS 
theory takes the current  simply as a given datum.  
 
 Thus, the COBECOS theory deviates from the theoretical ideal by taking  as 
given. Note, however, that from a practical perspective this is not much of an error. 
The reason is that in applying the COBECOS theory, enforcement effort is set at a point 
of time (or rather for a period such as a year) and not for the whole future. At this point 
of time, , is for the most part given as a function of future expectations for the fishery 
partly expressed by the enforcement feed-back rule as discussed above. Thus, 
whatever is done during the first period is not going to alter  drastically, especially if 
enforcement effort is set optimally.  
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5. Practical estimation of the shadow value of biomass 
 It is not very practical to solve the complete dynamic enforcement problem 
described in section 3. This is quite demanding even for just one enforcement control 
and one state variable, i.e. biomass (Sandal et al. 2004). In real fisheries enforcement 
there are usually several enforcement tools over which enforcement effort can be 
defined and often several state variables in terms of stocks and stock subsets. This level 
of complexity renders direct calculation according to the theoretical prescripts virtually 
infeasible. For this reason, it is of great practical importance to develop a feasible 
method for selecting a reasonably efficient enforcement effort  
 The COBECOS theory (expressed by (II) in section 1) is an attempt in this 
direction. However, to apply this theory it is necessary to obtain estimates of the 
shadow value of biomass. A practical approximate approach to do this is described 
below:  
 Fisheries enforcement effort (over the various enforcement tools) is usually 
determined for a period of time, often a year. At this point of decision, future fisheries 
enforcement effort and harvesting in future periods may be taken for granted e.g. as 
reflected in a presumed enforcement and/or harvesting feed-back rule as discussed in 
section 2. On this basis and the theory discussed in section 2 and 3 above, the following 
practical approach to determining the shadow value of biomass consisting of six steps 
is proposed. 
1. Obtain the basic enforcement model 
This is summarized by the expression:  
( ( , ; , *), ) ( ) ( ( ) ( , ; , *))B Q e x f q x C e G x Q e x f q    . 
And requires knowledge of the items discussed in 2.3  
2. Specify the enforcement feed-back rule, e = E(x;r,f,q*). Alternatively, the 
harvesting rule Q(x;r) may be used (see 2.2). These rules may be dynamic, i.e. 
shift over time.  
3. Assume future values of the exogenous parameters such as r, f, q* and prices. 
4. Calculate the value function V(x(0);r,f,q*) for a few strategically selected x(0)’s. 
5. Fit with the help of regression methods a simple function to these calculated 
points. This yields an estimated value function as a function of the initial 
biomass level which may be denoted as:  
  ˆ 0 ; , , *V x r f q  
6. For the current initial biomass level,  0x , say, calculate the shadow value of 
biomass.  
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Clarifications 
Step 1. The construction of the basic enforcement model requires knowledge of the 
items discussed in section 2.3  
1. The fishers’ private benefit function, B(q,x). 
2. The probability of penalty function, ( )e . 
3. The cost of enforcement function, C(e) 
4. The enforcement response function, q = Q(e,f,x,q*). This may be derived from 
the other data. 
5. The current level of biomass, x(0). 
6. The penalty parameter, f  
7. The rate of discount, r 
8. The various prices entering the cost and benefit functions 
 
Step 2. The enforcement rule or harvesting rule that should be employed should be the 
best guess of future policy. As mentioned, these rules may evolve over time or 
shift at one. 
Step 3. This is straight forward prediction. 
Step 4. This requires the calculation of the expression:  
  
0
 ( (0), , , *) ( ( ( ; , , *), ; , *), ) ( ( ; , , *)) r tV x r f q B Q E x r f q x f q x C E x r f q e dt

    .  
Subject to: ( ) ( ( ; , , *), ; , *)x G x Q E x r f q x f q  , x(0) given.  
which is a considerable task. However, the advantage is that this only needs to 
be done once for each x(0) selected. Although, of course, if some of the data, 
such as prices change, it may be deemed worthwhile to redo the calculations. 
One of the initial biomass points selected should be the optimal equilibrium 
whose value function is comparatively easy to calculate  
For five different initial biomass levels, this exercise will generate a value 
function scatter diagram as illustrated in Figure 2 
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 It is worth noting that environmental concerns can easily be included in the 
fishery value function by adding a term such (x) which is strictly positive and 
increasing in biomass, x . 
Step 5. The fit to the value function data points will usually be satisfactory with a 
simple functional form such as ˆ ln( (0) )V x     or a simple polynomial 
noting that the value function should be non-decreasing in biomass. The 
outcome will be as illustrated in Figure 3 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us refer to this estimated value function as  
  ˆ( (0); , , *)V x r f q  
Figure 2 
Examples of value function levels  
 
x(0)
V(x(0))
Figure 3 
A fitted value function 
 
x(0)
ˆ( (0))V x
 Tender specifications IPSC/2011104/07/NC | Service Contract No. 257233 | Final Report 33 of 75 
 
Step 6. Given the estimated value function, it is easy to calculate the shadow value of 
biomass as either the first derivative of the estimated value function: 
  
ˆ( (0); , , *)
(0)
V x r f q
x




 
 Or, if this derivative is not available, the approximation: 
ˆ ˆ( (0) ; , , *) ( (0); , , *)V x r f q V x r f q


 

.
 
There are several important advantages to the approach to estimating the shadow 
value of biomass described above.  
(1) The first and most important advantage is that it is perfectly feasible and, 
compared to solving the dynamic maximization problem in full, quite trivial. 
(2) The second great advantage is that it is theoretically consistent. Thus, if the 
enforcement feed-back rule is in fact optimal, then this method of determining 
the shadow value of biomass will lead to enforcement effort that actually 
replicates the enforcement feed-back rule.4  
(3) The third advantage is that this process in informationally accumulative. Thus, 
as an increasing number of value function points are calculated over time with 
different values of the exogenous variables f, q*, r and so on, the data basis for 
estimating a more complete value function including parameters for these 
varying parameters as well as different biomass levels is generated. Thus, pretty 
soon, it will be possible to calculate the response of the shadow value of 
biomass to these parameters as well.  
 
6. Calculations of shadow values: A simple numerical example 
What follows is a very simple example of calculation of shadow values on the 
assumption that data points for the value function have been calculated. It is of course 
possible to compute a numerical example from the scratch (the basic bioeconomic 
model), but that is considerably more work.  
Let there be four estimates of the value function as follows: 
 
 
                                                     
4
 I believe I can prove this mathematically, but the proof is outside the scope of this study.  
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Biomass Value 
50 0,38 
100 5,60 
250 16,27 
1000 40,51 
 
A polynomial equation that fits these points exactly is: 
  
0.6 1.7ˆ( (0)) (0) 0.0001 (0) 10V x x x    . 
This yields the estimated value function graph: 
 
 It immediately follows that the shadow value of biomass at different levels of 
biomass is estimated by the expression (see section 4):  
0.4 0.7
ˆ( (0); , , *)
0.6 (0) 0.00017 (0)
(0)
V x r f q
x x
x
 

    

. 
 
Figure 3 
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So, for any level of initial biomass the shadow value can be easily calculated by simply 
plugging the biomass into this equation. The graph of the shadow value is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As already mentioned, it is of course possible to derive the value function and 
the associated shadow values for any specified bio-economic enforcement model, 
provided the other data mentioned in chapter 4 are also provided. Depending on the 
complexity of the model, this may be significant work, however. The main reason is 
that it involves the calculation of an integral over time. The advantage is that only a few 
value function points have to be calculated.  
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PART 3 Extension of the theory to include 
administrative and newer control tools.  
 
 
On January 13, 2012, I contracted with the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water 
Management (SwAM) to assist in a pilot study for applying the COBECOS fisheries 
enforcement methodology. This report constitutes a partial fulfilment of my obligations 
under this contract, namely item 3.d of the contract. 
 
 
Reykjavik 1. May 2012 
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1.  Introduction 
 The fundamental COBECOS enforcement theory (COBECOS 2009) is quite 
general. The basic theory can accommodate a wide range of management controls and 
enforcement tools. However, to incorporate specific enforcement tools in the basic 
theoretical structure in a proper way is not always straight forward. This paper 
attempts to explain further how this can be done. More specifically, it considers certain 
novel types of enforcement tools; VMS (vessel monitoring system), ERS (electronic 
recording and reporting system) and ACC (administrative cross checks). Also, due to a 
special request, it says a few words about the enforcement of discarding rules.  
 The paper is organized as follows. The general COBECOS theory of multiple 
management controls and enforcement tools is laid out in section 2. In section 3, the 
application of this theory to VMS, ERS, ACC is discussed and explained. Section 4 deals 
specifically with the enforcement of discarding restrictions.  
2. Multiple enforcement tools  
 In this section the basic COBECOS enforcement theory is extended to include (i) 
multiple fisheries activities ― not just the volume of harvest, (ii) multiple management 
controls (targets) ― not just landings and (iii) multiple enforcement tools — not just 
enforcement of landings. As will become apparent, the basic theory extends in a 
straight-forward manner in this respect.  
2.1 Fishers’ actions 
 Let all possible fishers’ actions (including fishing time, search time, crew size, 
gear type, location etc.) be represented by the vector s.  
Harvests are produced by: 
 ( , )q Q x s , 
 where x is biomass. It is convenient to refer to the (I+1) vector (s,q) supposed to 
be (1xI) as the vector of possible fisheries actions. 
With general fisheries actions, instead of just harvests, there may be some 
impacts on the biomass growth function. For instance mesh size, timing of fishing and 
fishing areas may influence the growth of the biomass. A general modelling of this is: 
G(x,s), 
where G(x,s) is the biomass growth function, which now depends on the fisheries 
actions. If some action, si, has no effect on the biomass growth function, the 
corresponding derivative, ( )
is
G s , is identically zero.  
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Private benefits from fishing before taxes and penalties are defined by: 
(1) B(s,x)=p∙Q(s,x)-C(s), 
where p refers to the price of landings and C(s) to the cost of fishers‘ actions. 
2.2 Management controls 
 Fisheries managers may want to control any or all possible fishers’ actions. For 
instance, they may want to restrict harvests, q, (or landings) or they may want to 
control fishing time and areas, reduce discards and so on. In general they can impose 
restrictions on any fishers’ actions, i.e. the vector s, as well as the harvest, q. We refer 
to these management restrictions as a management controls.  
 To be worthwhile fisheries management controls must either alter components 
of fishers’ private benefit functions or the biological constraint. Any other controls are 
irrelevant to how the fishery is conducted.  Clearly, the maximum number of 
management controls is equal to the dimension of fishers’ actions, i.e. I+1 in this case. 
In practice only a few of these actions will actually be controlled.  
 It should be noted that fisheries managers may also want to alter the effective 
landings price or costs by taxation (positive or negative). This is a type of fisheries 
management and, as other management controls, requires enforcement. This is 
ignored in the current formulation, but could be included.  
2.3 Enforcement tools 
 Enforcement tools are all the methods enforcement authorities can use to 
increase adherence to the management controls. There is a great number of possible 
enforcement tools. Let all possible fisheries enforcement tools (including dock side 
monitoring, airplane hours, number of on-board observers, number of inspections, 
VMS, ERS etc.) be represented by an (1xJ) vector. Moreover, let the effort along all 
these tools be represented by the (1xJ) vector e. 
There will generally be costs associated with the enforcement actions. Let us 
express these costs by the enforcement cost function: 
 CE(e). 
2.3 Penalties 
 Penalties for violating management controls are given by the vector, f. Clearly 
the dimensionality of this vector equals the number of different management controls. 
More precisely this vector can be written as: 
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 f=(f1, f2,….. fI+1).  
 If there are no constraints on some possible fishers’ action, j, say, the 
corresponding penalty will be identically zero, 0jf  . Needless to say, in most 
enforcement situations, most of the elements in the f vector will be zero.  
 Note that, instead of being parameters as above, the penalties may actually be 
functions, e.g. of the extent of the violation.  
2.4 Probability of penalty  
 Probability of penalty for violating management restrictions is given by the 
following vector production function corresponding to all possible fisheries actions and 
harvests: 
 1 1( ) ( ( ), ( ),... ( ))     e e e e . 
 Note that in principle all probabilities of penalty depend on all the enforcement 
efforts. This is because e.g. a landing’s observer may detect fishing gear violation and 
so on. In accordance with the vector of fishers’ action in section 2.1, the last item in 
this vector represent the probability of suffering a penalty for violating harvesting 
restrictions. 
2.5 Private behaviour 
 Given the above specifications the private (or fishers’) maximization problem 
may be expressed as: 
(I) 
1
 ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( *) ( ) ( ( , ) *)
I
i i i q q
i
Max B Q x x f s s f Q x q 

       
s
s e e s . 
 In this formulation starred, ‘*’, variables refer to the allowable levels of fisheries 
actions. The simplification that all management controls are represented as an upper 
bound on the respective fishers’ actions is not necessary. A more general formulation is 
to write this as some function of the action and the management control, 
*( , )i is s , say. 
For that formulation we may rewrite (I) as : 
(Ib) 
1
 ( ( , ), ) ( ) ( , *) ( ) ( ( , ), *)
I
i i i q q
i
Max B Q x x f s s f Q x q 

     
s
s e e s  
 The solution to this private maximization problem may be written as the (1xI+1) 
vector function (more generally correspondence): 
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(2)  ( , , *, *), ( ( , , *, *), )x q Q x q xS e; f s S e; f s .  
 Equation (2) is the enforcement response function in the multiple management 
control, multiple enforcement tool case. It defines how the various fishers’ actions 
depend on the vector of enforcement effort, e, biomass, x, and management controls, 
(s*,q*).  
2.6 Social optimization 
The social maximization problem is: 
(II)  ( ( ( , , , *, *), ), ) ( ( , ( , , , *, *)) ( ( , , , *, *), )) ( )Max B Q x s q x x G x x s q Q x s q x CE   
e
S e f S e f S e f e  
 Apart from the generalizations there is one important difference between this 
social problem and the one in the basic COBECOS theory (COBECOS 2009). This is the 
inclusion of fishers’ action in the biomass growth function. This is because some of the 
fisher’s actions e.g. fishing gear choice, area-time choices and size selectivity may affect 
biomass growth.  
The necessary conditions for solving this problem are informative: 
(3) 
1
[ ( )] 0,   0,
i i i j
I
i
s s s e j
i j
s
B G Q CE e
e



      

  
1
[ ( )] =0
i i i j
I
i
s s s e j
i j
s
B G Q CE e
e


 
        
 , all j=1,2…J. 
Thus, for all management actions which are undertaken (ej>0), the following has to 
hold  
 
1
[ ( )] 0,  
i i i j
I
i
s s s e
i j
s
B G Q CE
e



     

  all ej>0. 
 Expression (3) defines the optimal enforcement effort level and therefore also 
the optimal mix of all possible enforcement tools. The principle is that the enforcement 
effort for all tools that are used should at a level where it produces the same marginal 
benefits, namely zero. The level of effort for other tools must equal zero.  
Obviously, to work out the solution corresponding to (3) requires knowledge of 
(i) the private benefit function, (ii) the cost of enforcement function, (iii) the probability 
of penalty function, (iv) the penalty structure as well as the management restrictions 
for all possible fishers’ actions. With that knowledge in hand, the private maximizing 
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solution in equation (2) can be derived and subsequently the expression for optimal 
enforcement effort mix given in (3).  
3. Specific enforcement tools 
 In this section we will consider certain specific enforcement tools suggested by 
SwAM and how they can be modeled within the basic COBECOS fisheries enforcement 
theory. In all cases we assume that there are two management controls (i) a catch 
constraint, q* and (ii) an area constraint, a*. We also assume that in addition of the 
specific enforcement tools considered, there are some other tools employed such as 
dockside monitoring, at-sea monitoring, observer monitoring and so on. In the interest 
of simplifying the notation, we represent these jointly by one enforcement effort 
variable, e. For ease of understanding, we will present these examples along the lines 
set out in the theory in section 2. 
3.1 VMS 
 VMS makes it easier to establish the location of the fishing vessel at all times as 
well as some other aspects of its behaviour.  
Enforcement model components:  
Fishers’ actions: Area choice, a; harvest level, q and fisheries inputs, z. Represent 
this by the vector (a,q,z). 
Fishers’ benefits: B(q,x). This assumes that the actions a and z do not affect 
benefits directly but only through q and x. This is for simplicity 
of exposition only. More generally the benefit function would 
be B(q,x,a,z). 
Harvest function: The level of harvest depends on fisheries inputs, area choice 
and the level of biomass; q=Q(z,a,x) 
Biomass growth: G(x,a)-q 
Management controls: Area restrictions and catch restrictions, (a*,q*). 
Enforcement tools: General enforcement and VMS. The effort on each is 
represented by the vector (e,eVMS). 
Cost of enforcement: C(e,eVMS) 
Penalties: Penalties for harvest violations, fq, and area violations fa.  
Probability of penalty: ( , )q VMSe e  and ( , )a VMSe e . 
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Private maximization: 
The problem is:  
,
 ( ( , , ), ) ( , ) ( ( , , ) *) ( , ) ( *)q q VMS a a VMS
z a
Max B Q z a x x f e e Q z a x q f e e a a        
 
Note that the difference (a-a*) must be interpreted as some measure of area violation. 
The necessary conditions are: 
( , ) 0Q z q q VMS zB Q f e e Q     , if z>0, 
( , ) ( , ) 0Q a q q VMS a a a VMSB Q f e e Q f e e        , if a>0. 
Solving these equations produces the enforcement response equations: 
 ( , , , , , *, *)VMS q az Z e e x f f q a , 
 ( , , , , , *, *)VMS q aa A e e x f f q a . 
 
Optimal enforcement  
,
 ( ( ( , , , , , *, *), ( , , , , , *, *), ), )
       ( ( , ( , , , , , *, *), )) ( ( , , , , , *, *), ( , , , , , *, *), ))
      ( , )
VMS
VMS q a VMS q a
e e
VMS q a VMS q a VMS q a
VMS
Max B Q Z e e x f f q a A e e x f f q a x x
G x A e e x f f q a x Q Z e e x f f q a A e e x f f q a x
CE e e
  

  
This maximization problem may seem more complicated than it actually is. Remember 
that for the maximization only the enforcement efforts e and eVMS are actually variable.  
Application: What needs to be done? 
 The above tell us what needs to be done in addition to the standard COBECOS 
work. The following functions need to be estimated.  
(1) A harvesting function, Q(z,a,x), including area choices needs to be empirically 
estimated. 
(2) The impact of area choice on the biomass growth function, G(x,a), needs to be 
estimated.  
(3) A joint cost function including both enforcement efforts, C(e,eVMS), needs to be 
estimated. 
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(4) The two joint probability of penalty functions, ( , )q VMSe e  and ( , )a VMSe e , need 
to be estimated. 
The parameters, a* and fa need to be established just as q* and fq. 
 Apart from this, the application of the theory proceeds in the usual way. 
Maximization procedures will be more complicated than in the single enforcement 
effort case but eminently feasible.  
3.2 ERS 
 ERS can contribute to the enforcement of many fisheries management controls. 
In our example it can contribute to both catch and area restrictions in the same 
qualitative way as the VMS discussed above. It follows that to apply the COBECOS 
enforcement theory will proceed in exactly the same way as that described for the VMS 
above. All that needs to be done is to replace the acronym VMS with ERS 
 Note that the harvesting function, Q(z,a,x) and the biomass growth function, 
G(x,a), which only depend on fishers’ actions and not on the enforcement tools, do not 
need to be re-estimated. The probability of penalty functions, ( , )q ERSe e  and 
( , )a ERSe e  will be different and may well be more difficult to assess. 
3.3 ACC 
 ACC (administrative cross checks) consist of comparing reports from various 
stages of the harvesting (including log-books), landings, processing, distributional and 
marketing process in order to detect deviations indicative of violations. This process 
can contribute to the enforcement of actual catches and several other fishers’ actions 
that are subject to controls. Thus, from an analytical and empirical perspective ACC 
works in a similar way to ERS or VMS. However, for the sake of illustration let us 
consider the case where there is only one management control, the volume of harvest, 
q, and ACC contributes to the enforcement of this.  
Enforcement model components:  
Fisheries actions: Area choice, a; harvest level, q and fisheries inputs, z. Represent 
this by the vector (a,q,z). 
Harvest function: The level of harvest depends on fisheries inputs, area choice 
and the level of biomass; q=Q(z,a,x) 
Biomass growth: G(x,a)-q 
Management controls: In this case only catch restrictions, q*. 
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Enforcement tools: General enforcement and ACC. The effort on each is 
represented by the vector (e,eACC). 
Cost of enforcement: C(e,eACC) 
Penalties: Penalties for harvest violations, fq.  
Probability of penalty: ( , )q ACCe e . 
 
Private maximization: 
The problem is:  
,
 ( ( , , ), ) ( , ) ( ( , , ) *)q q ACC
z a
Max B Q z a x x f e e Q z a x q   
 
The necessary conditions are: 
( , ) 0Q z q q ACC zB Q f e e Q     , if z>0, 
( , ) 0Q a q q ACC aB Q f e e Q     , if a>0. 
Solving these equations produces the enforcement response equations: 
 ( , , , , *)ACC qz Z e e x f q , 
 ( , , , , *)ACC qa A e e x f q . 
Optimal enforcement  
,
 ( ( ( , , , , *), ( , , , , *), ), )
       ( ( , ( , , , , *), )) ( ( , , , , *), ( , , , , *, ), )
      ( , )
ACC
ACC q ACC q
e e
ACC q ACC q ACC q
ACC
Max B Q Z e e x f q A e e x f q x x
G x A e e x f q x Q Z e e x f q A e e x f q x x
CE e e
  
  
4. Enforcing discarding restrictions.  
 Fisheries management often aims at reducing or eliminating discards. To do so 
obviously requires enforcement.  
 The rationale for reducing discards is not always very clear (Arnason 1994). 
Discarding obviously benefits the fishers; otherwise it wouldn´t occur. This may be 
detrimental to society for several reasons. First, discarding may distort catch statistics, 
which often only count landings: Second, discarding of catches may be distressing to a 
part of the population. Third, discarding may be caused by other restrictions such as 
individual catch quotas and therefore be socially inefficient while privately beneficial.  
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 The following describes the essential steps in constructing a discarding (and 
landings) enforcement model.  
 
Enforcement model components:  
Fishers’ actions: Harvest level, q and discarding, d. Represent this by the vector 
(q,d). 
Fishers’ benefits: Discarding in general affects fishers’ benefit function. First it 
must be subtracted from catches which generally reduces 
benefits. However, if the cost of bringing the discarded catch to 
shore exceeds the price, discarding is directly beneficial. This 
would be the case if it happens under no particular fisheries 
management (Arnason, 1994). Therefore, in general, the benefit 
function should be written as B(q,d,x).  
Harvest function: Since in this formulation harvest is assumed to be the fishers’ 
decision variable a harvesting function is not needed.  
Biomass growth: G(x,a)-q 
Management controls: Catch and discarding restrictions, (q*,d*). Note that d* may be 
zero.  
Enforcement tools: General enforcement and discarding enforcement. Enforcement 
of discarding restrictions may be effected in many ways with 
which we do not have to be concerned here. The effort on each 
enforcement tool is represented by the vector (e,ed). 
Cost of enforcement: C(e,ed) 
Penalties: Penalties for harvest violations, fq, and for discarding fd.  
Probability of penalty: ( , )q de e  and ( , )a de e . 
Social benefits: ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ( ) )dB q d x CD d C e e G x q     , where CD(d) is the 
social cost of discarding e.g. because it distresses the general 
population.  
Private maximization: 
The fishers’ problem is:  
,
 ( , , ) ( , ) ( *) ( , ) ( *)q q d d d d
z d
Max B q d x f e e q d q f e e d d         
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 Note that this formulation of the private problem assumes that discards cannot 
be verified (or penalized) as catches.5 It follows that for the fishers discarding has 
double benefits. It affects the benefit function directly and it reduces expected 
penalties for excessive catches.  
The necessary conditions for solving this problem are: 
( , ) 0q q q dB f e e   , if q>0, 
( , ) ( , ) 0d q q d d d dB f e e f e e      , if d>0. 
In the 2nd necessary condition, note the additional benefits form discarding in terms of 
reduced marginal penalties, ( , )q q df e e . 
Solving these equations produces the enforcement response equations: 
 ( , , , , , *, *)d q dq Q e e x f f q d , 
 ( , , , , , *, *)d q dd D e e x f f q d . 
 
Optimal enforcement  
,
 ( ( , , , , , *, *), ( , , , , , *, *), ) ( ( , , , , , *, *)) ( , )
         ( ( ) ( , , , , , *, *))
d
d q d d q d d q d d
e e
d q d
Max B Q e e x f f q d D e e x f f q d x CD D e e x f f q d C e e
G x Q e e x f f q d
 
  
 
How to apply 
To apply the above theory the following functions need to be estimated. 
(5) Fishers’ private benefit function including discards.  
(6) A joint cost function including both enforcement efforts, C(e,ed).  
(7) The two joint probability of penalty functions, ( , )q de e  and ( , )d de e . 
(8) The social cost of discarding function CD(d). This, if not identically equal to zero, 
may be difficult to estimate very precisely.  
In addition, the parameters, d* and fd  as well as q* and fq need to be established.  
                                                     
5
 This assumption can of course be dropped and the modelling generalized.  
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Apart from this, the application of the theory proceeds in the usual way.   
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Preface 
 
According to the Swedish COBECOS pilot study contractual obligations, the Final Report 
should be accompanied by the software implementation along with feedback on 
simulations, and should be made available as a deliverable (D3) upon final completion 
of the Tender (month 18). The following report and annexes constitute the fulfilment 
of this obligation.  
 
Gothenburg 29 November 2013 
 
For the contractor in the Swedish COBECOS Pilot Study,  
 
Jenny Nord and Malin Hultgren 
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1. Background 
  
 Following up lessons learnt from EU funded (FP6) research project COBECOS 
(https://cobecos.jrc.ec.europa.eu/), where JRC was scientific coordinator, the main 
objective of the current study is the pilot implementation of the COBECOS theory and 
software in the specific context of two Swedish fisheries managed and enforced by the 
Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM).  
 The FP6 project COBECOS estimated the cost of EU fisheries enforcement to be 
between 150 and 600 Million Euro. Making enforcement more effective can result in 
significant social and economic benefits of the order of tens of millions of Euro. 
Furthermore, the FP6 COBECOS project resulted in the awareness that a number of 
pilot implementations of COBECOS are still needed before developing validated 
operational-grade tools that could then be used by EU fisheries enforcement and 
control agencies for their daily work. In fact, each enforcement situation has its own 
particular features that must be accounted for in the application of the COBECOS 
enforcement theory and software, and pilots are necessary to help understand these 
particularities. The most striking outcome of COBECOS was that the optimal 
enforcement system maximizing social benefit, expressed in terms of enforcement 
tools and their optimal intensity, seems to be very far away from the current situation 
for most of the case studies analyzed. 
 Under the contract IPSC/2011/04/07/NC-Service Cntr. 257233, the COBECOS 
theory is applied to two relatively simple fisheries, managed and enforced by the 
Swedish fisheries enforcement authorities, namely, the Swedish cod trawl fishery in the 
Baltic Sea (single-species) and the demersal trawl fishery in Kattegat and Skagerrak 
(multi-species). SwAM : 
 provided a general description of the two trawl fisheries: their fisheries 
management systems, their fisheries enforcement systems and the costs and 
effectiveness of the enforcement.  
 compiled time series (2009-2011) of quantitative/qualitative data on variables 
crucial for estimation of theoretical relationships, such as:  
 private and social benefit function of fishing (bio-economic modeling 
data) 
 cost of enforcement function (enforcement costs and enforcement 
effort data)  
 probability of penalty function (sanctions over number of violations)  
 penalty schedule (usually specified in regulations).  
 provided a bio-economic model (necessary for the private benefit function and 
the stock dynamics) for the aforementioned fisheries. 
 provided short-cut methods to obtain approximately correct values of the 
shadow value of fish stocks (i.e. the value of leaving one unit of the stock 
behind; allowing it to grow spawn and reproduce), an important concept in 
optimal fisheries management and fisheries enforcement. 
  
 SwAM by pulling together all the above information (Deliverables 1 & 2), 
provided necessary services allowing JRC to run simulations based on the existing 
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COBECOS software. Following these simulations, JRC extended and improved the 
current COBECOS software producing a user friendly version easy to exercise by any 
non-IT skilled stakeholder. This new implementation incorporated administrative 
controls, which are becoming increasingly important as well as any other cost effective 
mean to conduct fisheries controls. The FP6 project COBECOS failed to deal with them 
in the past analyses.  
 Feedback on interpretation of the results of simulations by JRC ("what if" 
scenarios) was provided by SwAM, so that the most effective means of control (both in 
terms of cost as well as compliance) will be identified by the Swedish authorities for 
potential future control and enforcement schemes. At this final stage, the software can 
be considered an operational tool for control and enforcement agencies. 
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2. Software Implementation  
 The whole implementation was developed in R (www.r-project.org) which is 
available as Free Software under the terms of the Free Software Foundation's GNU 
General Public License in source code form. It is platform independent, compiling and 
running on a wide variety of UNIX platforms and similar systems (including FreeBSD 
and Linux), Windows and MacOS. 
 The version used in this study was R version 2.15.3 - 2013/03/01 (R Core Team, 
2013) ran inside RStudio (RStudio, 2013) a developer environment for R. A graphical 
representation of the implementation can be visualized in figure 1. 
The software package developed uses input fisheries data of bio-economic 
nature as well as control and enforcement data. Through a user-friendly Graphical User 
Interface it outputs optimal levels of control at the lower costs, so that to obtain higher 
benefits from the fishery for the society.  
 
 
Figure 1. Flow chart of the current implementation  
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Data 
 
Required data types include: 
 bio-economic nature data  
- stock size,  
- catch,  
- catch limits-TACs,  
- market prices,  
- operational costs  
 Control and enforcement data 
- control effort,  
- enforcement cost,  
- number of infringements,  
- penalty levels 
 
User interface 
  
 The user interface (UI) was developed using innovative 'Shiny' package in 
RStudio (version 0.1.0 - 28/7/2012 - http://www.rstudio.com/shiny/) which allows to 
turn analyses previously running solely under R into interactive web applications 
without developing HTML or Java applications. Although Shiny package itself is 
designed to run locally (current implementation) it can also be deployed over the web 
if needed. 
Three R scripts are responsible for delivering the user interface: 
 run.R (calls ui.R and server.R and translates R into HTML pages)  
 ui.R  (definition of the user interface design; renders server.R outputs) 
 server.R (read data inputs; main R coding and analyses; call COBECOS script)  
  
 The UI consists of a sidebar on the left in which user can select initial inputs and 
adjust levels of input parameters: 
 Basic inputs 
- data file to read 
- case study to analyse 
 Input for Exploratory plots 
- Enforcement type under consideration 
- Enforcement effort vs Probability of sanction plot (EP plot) 
- Enforcement effort vs Cost of enforcement plot (EC plot) 
 Adjust initial inputs of some parameters 
- TAC levels 
- Available stock biomass 
- Administrative control Fine level 
- Landings control Fine level 
- Market price of fish 
- Fishing costs 
- Shadow value of biomass for the exploited stock  
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The main panel hosts two panels (as tabs): 
 Data Exploratory tab (Fig. 2) 
- The user can view the scatter-plots of EP or EC plots and identify the 
underlying relationships between Effort-Probability and Effort-Cost. 
- Summary info table of enforcement effort and landings (aggregated by 
Year, Area, Enforcement type) 
- Summary info on mean enforcement Cost & average probability of 
sanction (aggregated by Year, Area, Enforcement type) 
 Cost-Benefit Analyses tab (Fig. 3) 
- Social Benefit vs Enforcement effort plots 
- Fishery Response vs Social & Private Benefits plots 
- Detailed results of Cost-Benefit Analysis in tabular format 
- 2D level plot of Probability of detection vs enforcement control effort  & 
Effort vs Cost relationship plots 
Figure 2.View of the Data Exploratory tab in the main panel 
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Figure 3.View of the Cost-Benefit Analyses tab in the main panel 
 
Cost-Benefit analyses 
  
 All cost-benefit optimization analyses are based largely on the script developed 
for COBECOS FP6 project by Charles Edwards and Tom Carruthers and specifically the 
latest version v.2.11 - June 2009.  
 Private Benefit and Social Objective functions were revised and the COBECOS 
script was updated to be used in the Swedish fisheries assigned a version number of 
v.3.01. The key functional aspects of the COBECOS approach are listed below: 
 1. Defines the functional form of private and social benefit functions 
 Default functional forms exist but users are encouraged to specify 
their own 
2. Evaluates the private and social benefits at user defined levels of 
enforcement effort 
 User defines a vector of enforcement effort (that can be 'real world' 
or hypothetical) 
 Returns the social and private benefits at these effort levels given the 
Effort-Cost and Effort-Probability relationships 
 Plots the marginal social benefit(s) across enforcement level(s) 
 Returns the predicted level of catch 
3. Evaluates the private and social benefits at optimal levels of enforcement 
effort. 
 Optimisation routines select enforcement effort(s) to maximise the 
social benefit 
 Returns the social and private benefits at these effort levels given the 
Effort-Cost and Effort-Probability relationships 
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 Plots the marginal benefits across enforcement level 
 Returns the predicted level of catch 
4. Allows the user to specify types of stochastic uncertainty and evaluate 
social and private benefits 
 Implementation error introduces uncertainty in the fisher's response 
to a specific enforcement effort level 
 Estimation error introduces uncertainty around the estimated Efiort- 
Cost and Effort-Probability relationships 
 Either or both types of uncertainty can be included 
 Enforcement levels can be optimised or set to user defined levels 
 
 The corresponding aforementioned functional relationships have been 
described in detail within Deliverable 2 of this report.  
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3. Simulations 
Initially the models were fed with the inputs provided by SwAM, which actually 
depict the current situation regarding:  
- stock status,  
- harvest rates,  
- enforcement effort,  
- enforcement costs and  
- probability of been sanctioned 
 After viewing the outputs and comparing optimized levels against current ones 
some potential changes were investigated by Case Study. 
 In general, variations in the enforcement effort affect the probability of being 
detected when violating, and consequently the private cost of violation. As fishers 
operate to maximize their profit, the level of violation will decrease if expected cost of 
violating increases. The optimal level of violation (i.e. compliance) for the fisherman is 
obtained when the marginal cost of violating equals the marginal benefit of violating. 
Naturally, the enforcement effort is also affecting the cost of enforcement and has to 
be deducted from the benefits brought upon by it.  
 
Case study 2E 
Initial values used as input 
Parameter 
Admin. Controls 
value 
Landing 
controls value 
Reference 
Current enforcement effort 1.0 0.174 SwAM Deliv.1 
Investigated min 
 enforcement effort 
0.01 0.01  
Investigated max 
enforcement effort 
1.0 1.0  
Parameter Value Reference 
Fishery Response 8,721,900 kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Min_Response investigated 500,000 kg  
Max_Response investigated 65,000,000 kg  
Cod TAC 14,000,000 kg EC COM 1088/2012 
Cod Biomass 290,000,000 kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fines (Admin. Control) 0.0011 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fines (Landings Control) 0.0014 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fishing cost 6.2 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Cod market price 13.5 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Cod Shadow value of biomass 5.0 SEK/kg  
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 Current status 
 
FISHERY:   Swedish trawlers targeting Cod  
AREA:      Eastern Baltic waters - ICES 27 IIId  
PERIOD:    2009-2011 
 
Number of Enforcement types:  2  
Names of Enforcement types:  Administrative Control - Landings Control  
Number of Stocks:             1  
Names of Stocks:             Cod  
 
Current enforcement effort by enf. type (stand.): 1   0.174  
Investigated Min enforcement effort by enf. type: 0.01   0.01  
Investigated Max enforcement effort by enf. type: 1   1  
Optimized enforcement effort by enf. type:           0.011  0.01  
Total enforc. costs by enf. type (SEK/year):   108308  4314258  
Effort optimized enforc. costs by enf.type(SEK): 1132   247945  
Probability of violation by enforcement type:  0.0324  0.0311  
Current fine levels by enforcement type (SEK/kg): 0.22   0.11  
 
Current TAC for Cod(kg):                                  1.4e+07  
Current available biomass for Cod (kg):                    2.9e+08  
Current fishery response (Cod landings - kg) :            8721900  
Model output fishery response (Cod landings - kg):        9056927  
Investigated Min response level (Cod landings - kg):      5e+05  
Investigated Max response level (Cod landings - kg):      6.5e+07  
 
Current fishing costs (SEK/kg) :                          6.5  
Current Cod market price of landings (SEK/kg):            13.5  
Estimated shadow value of biomass of Cod stock (SEK/kg):  5  
 
Estimated Social Benefit (SEK) :   15603450  
Estimated Private Benefit (SEK) :  61140308 
* SEK = Swedish kroner 
 
Graph indications throughout the text 
 A dotted red line indicates the level of the predictor variable (X-axis) at which 
the response variable (Y axis) reaches a global maximum. A solid blue line indicates the 
optimal level suggested by the model outputs. 
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Social Benefit and response vs Enforcement effort plots 
Fishery Response vs Social & Private Benefits plots 
2D level plot of Probability of detection against enforcement control effort - Effort-Cost 
relationship plots 
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 Exploratory plots confirmed a linear relationship for the Enforcement effort - 
Cost of enforcement relationship, while Enforcement effort - Probability of sanction 
was nowhere close to any established functional relationship. As a result the default 
bilinear equation of Prob = a*Effort1 + b*Effort2 + c*Effort1*Effort2 was used. 
 The optimal enforcement system maximizing social benefit, expressed in terms 
of enforcement tools and their optimal intensity, seems to be very far away from the 
current situation. The very low number of violations suggests that the fishery is either 
'compliant' or control is ineffective to detect infringements. As a result, optimized 
effort of control suggests that the current levels are not contributing to the overall 
social benefit more than if these levels would be lowered 10-fold for landings controls 
(from 0.174 down to 0.01) and 90-fold for the Administrative controls (from 1.0 to 
0.011). [Note: effort is standardized between 0-1; 1 indicating 100% control, 0 absence 
of control]. Additionally the quite high TAC (14,000 tons) compared to the much lower 
current response (8,721 tons) suggests that a higher response, lower than the TAC, will 
not contribute negatively to the social benefit, while it will increase private benefit. 
Most likely this is an effect of the current market price of Cod (13.5 SEK/kg), being 
twice that of the fishing costs (6.5 SEK/kg), and the selected (low?) shadow value of 
biomass (5 SEK/kg). 
 
Simulations-Scenarios 
 All the plausible combinations of the 7 'adjustable' parameters (TAC, Biomass, 
Administrative control fines, Landings control fines, market price, fishing costs, shadow 
value of biomass) taken 1, 2..., 7 at a time are given by the formula for combinations in 
the table below: 
(
 
 
)  
  
  (   ) 
           (   )(   )   
( 
 
)=7 
( 
 
)=21 
( 
 
)=35 
( 
 
)=35 
( 
 
)=21 
( 
 
)=7 
( 
 
)=1 
Total: 127 
 
 So, there are at least 127 different potential scenarios, without changing the 
default values of the aforementioned 7 variables. Taking into account changes in the 
default values of these 7 parameters, we end up with an infinite number of scenarios, 
an exercise left to the users to investigate. 
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Scenario 1 
Investigate the following changes in the fishery: 
- increase fishing costs by 25% (due to a future fuel price hike) 
- increase market price by 25% (to compensate for rising fishing costs) 
- increase of average fine to ~1 SEK/kg for both enforcement types (increasing fishing 
cost will amplify the incentives of fishers to infringe) 
- Increase the shadow value of biomass to the level of market price 
 
FISHERY:  Swedish trawlers targeting Cod  
AREA:     Eastern Baltic waters - ICES 27 IIId  
PERIOD:   2009-2011  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of Enforcement types :  2  
Names of Enforcement types :   Administrative Control - Landings Control  
Number of Stocks:              1  
Names of Stocks:               Cod  
 
Current enforcement effort by enf. type (standardized 0-1): 1  0.174  
Investigated Min enforcement effort by enf. type :          0.01  0.01  
Investigated Max enforcement effort by enf. type :          1  1  
Optimized enforcement effort by enf. type (stand. 0-1):     1  0.0482  
Total enforcement costs by enf. type (SEK/year):   108308 4314258  
Optimized costs of enforcement by enforc. type(SEK):     108308 1196873  
Probability of violation by enforcement type :             1  0.1418812  
Current fine levels by enforcement type (SEK/kg) :         1.222 1.222  
 
Current TAC for Cod(kg):                                   1.4e+07  
Current avaiable biomass for Cod (kg):                     2.9e+08  
Current fishery response (Cod landings - kg) :             8721900  
Model output fishery response (Cod landings - kg):         7961246  
Investigated Min response level (Cod landings - kg):       5e+05  
Investigated Max response level (Cod landings - kg):       6.5e+07  
 
Current fishing costs (SEK/kg) :                           8  
Current Cod market price of landings (SEK/kg):             16  
Estimated shadow value of biomass of Cod stock (SEK/kg):   15  
 
Estimated Social Benefit (SEK) :    -51479375  
Estimated Private Benefit (SEK) :    77670845 
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Social Benefit and response vs Enforcement effort plots 
Fishery Response vs Social & Private Benefits plots 
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 In this scenario, (fuel price increase, market price increase, fine increase to >1 
SEK/kg, shadow value of biomass ~ market value) the suggested optimal enforcement 
levels are quite close to the current ones, although still lower for the landings control.  
Increased fishing costs were compensated by an increase in market price, and although 
fishers reduced fishing effort and corresponding landings by circa 10% (from 8700 rons 
down to 7900 tons) the private benefit of the fleet remained more or less unaffected, 
even increasing by ~20% (from 61 million SEK to 77 million SEK). 
 Assigning a higher value to the shadow value of biomass resulted in a great loss 
in social benefit, indicating that a valuable future resource was harvested for the sake 
of an ephemeral private benefit. The increase of enforcement effort costs had an 
insignificant contribution to the overall negative social benefit, since this was driven by 
the increased shadow value of biomass. 
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Case study 1W 
Initial values used as input 
Parameter 
Admin. Controls 
value 
Landing 
controls value 
Reference 
Current enforcement effort 1.0 0.068 SwAM Deliv.1 
Investigated min 
 enforcement effort 
0.01 0.01  
Investigated max 
enforcement effort 
1.0 1.0  
Parameter Value Reference 
Fishery Response (Cod) 264,122 kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fishery Response (Nephrops) 269,325 kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fishery Response (Pollack) 220,980 kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Min_Response investigated (Cod) 1,000 kg  
Min_Response investigated 
(Nephrops) 
1,000 kg  
Min_Response investigated (Pollack) 1,000 kg  
Max_Response investigated (Cod) 800,000 kg  
Max_Response investigated 
(Nephrops) 
7,000,000 kg  
Max_Response investigated 
(Pollack) 
600,000 kg  
Cod TAC 607,000 kg EC COM 1088/2012 
Nephrops TAC 6,000,000 kg ICES (2012) 
Pollack TAC 8,000,000 kg ICES (2012) - No TAC 
Cod Biomass 6,070,000 kg 
Assuming a 10%  
harvest rate  -  
based on ICES (2012) 
Nephrops biomass 
136,000,000 
kg 
ICES (2012) 
Pollack biomass 7,900,000 kg 
Assuming a 5%  
harvest rate  -  
based on ICES (2012) 
Fines (Admin. Control) 0.22 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fines (Landings Control) 0.11 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Fishing cost 12.0 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Cod market price 13.5 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Nephrops market price 89.5 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Pollack market price 13.5 SEK/kg SwAM Deliv.1 
Cod Shadow value of biomass 5.0 SEK/kg  
Nephrops Shadow value of biomass 30.0 SEK/kg  
Pollack Shadow value of biomass 5.0 SEK/kg  
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Current status 
FISHERY:  Demersal trawlers  
AREA:     Swedish western coast - Kattegat-Skagerrak - ICES 27 IIIa  
PERIOD:   2009-2011  
 
Number of Enforcement types :  2  
Names of Enforcement types :   Admin. Controls - Landing Controls  
Number of Stocks:              3  
Names of Stocks:               COD NEP POK  
 
Current enforcement effort by enf. type:         1.0  0.068 
Investigated Min enforcement effort by enf. type: 0.01   0.01  
Investigated Max enforcement effort by enf. type : 1   1  
Optimized enforcement effort by enf. type:  0.01  0.01  
Total enforc. costs by enf. type (SEK/year):    143898  4664255 
Effort optimized costs by enforc. type (SEK):  1438.9  685920  
Probability of violation by enforcement type:  0.0311  0.0311  
Current fine levels by enforcement type (SEK/kg): 0.22   0.11  
 
Current TAC for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack(kg):            6e+05   6e+06    8e+06  
Current biomass for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (kg): 6100000 1.36e+08 8e+06  
Current response for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (kg): 264122  269325   220980  
Model output response for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack(kg):  148466  1004253  124215  
Investigated Min response for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack:  1000    1000     1000  
Investigated Max response for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack:  8e+05   7e+06    6e+05  
 
Current fishing costs for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (SEK/kg): 12   12   12  
Current market price for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (SEK/kg):    13.5 89.5 13.5  
Estimated shadow val. biomass Cod-Nephrops-Pollack(SEK/kg):5    30   5  
 
Estimated Social Benefit (SEK) :   13233802  
Estimated Private Benefit (SEK) :  46911199 
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Social Benefit and response vs Enforcement effort plots 
Fishery Response vs Social & Private Benefits plots 
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 Once again the optimal enforcement system maximizing social benefit, 
expressed in terms of enforcement tools and their optimal intensity, seems to be very 
far away from the current situation. Optimized effort of control suggests that the 
current levels are not contributing to the overall social benefit more than if these levels 
would be lowered 7-fold for landings controls (from 0.068 down to 0.01) and 90-fold 
for the Administrative controls (from 1.0 to 0.011). [Note: effort is standardized 
between 0-1; 1 indicating 100% control, 0 absence of control].  
 Additionally the quite high TACs (6,000 tons) for Nephrops and the high levels of 
available biomass (136,000 tons) suggest that a higher response, almost 4-fold (1,000 
tons), will not contribute negatively to the social benefit, while it will increase private 
benefit. Once more this is probably an effect of the current market price of Nephrops 
(89.5 SEK/kg), being 7-times that of the fishing costs (12.0 SEK/kg), and the selected 
(low?) shadow value of biomass (30 SEK/kg). 
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Scenario 1 
Investigate the following changes in the fishery: 
- increase fishing costs by 25% (due to a future fuel price hike) 
- increase market price by 20% for cod and pollack-not nephrops (to compensate for 
rising fishing costs) 
- increase of average fine to ~1 SEK/kg for both enforcement types (increasing fishing 
cost will amplify the incentives of fishers to infringe) 
- Increase the shadow value of biomass to the level of market price 
- Lower Nephrops TAC to 1,000 tons 
 
FISHERY:  Demersal trawlers  
AREA:     Swedish western coast  - Kattegat-Skagerrak - ICES 27 IIIa  
PERIOD:   2009-2011  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of Enforcement types :  2  
Names of Enforcement types :   Admin. Controls - Landing Controls  
Number of Stocks:              3  
Names of Stocks:               COD NEP POK  
 
Current enforcement effort by enf. type (stand. 0-1): 1  0.068  
Investigated Min enforcement effort by enf. type :  0.01  0.01  
Investigated Max enforcement effort by enf. type :  1  1  
Optimized enforcement effort by enf. type (stand. 0-1): 0.577 0.01  
Enforc. costs in current effort by enf. type (SEK/year): 143898 4664256  
Optimized total costs of enforc. by enforc. type (SEK): 83132 685920  
Probability of violation by enforcement type:   0.8664 0.0311  
Fine levels for violations by enforcement type (SEK/kg): 0.8  0.8  
 
Current TAC for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack(kg):  6e+05   1e+06    8e+06  
Current biomass for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (kg): 6100000 1.36e+08 8e+06  
Current response for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (land/kg): 264122  269325   220980  
Model response for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (land/kg): 1433477 797040   123616  
Investigated Min response for Cod-Neph.-Pollack (land/kg):  1000  1000  1000  
Investigated Max response for Cod-Neph.-Pollack (land/kg):  8e+05 7e+06 6e+05  
 
Current fishing costs for Cod-Nephrops-Pollack (SEK/kg):           15 15   15  
Current market price of landings for Cod-Neph.-Pollack (SEK/kg):   17 89.5 17.5  
Estimated shadow value of biomass for Cod-Neph.-Pollack (SEK/kg):  13 88   13  
 
Estimated Social Benefit (SEK) :   -37567574  
Estimated Private Benefit (SEK) :  44478571 
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Social Benefit and response vs Enforcement effort plots 
Fishery Response vs Social & Private Benefits plots 
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 In this scenario, (fuel price increase, market price increase, fine increase to >1 
SEK/kg, shadow value of biomass ~ market value, lower Nephrops TAC) the suggested 
optimal enforcement levels are lower than the current ones, 2-fold for administrative 
controls and 7-fold for the landings control.  
 Increased fishing costs were compensated by an increase in market price, and 
fishers relocated their fishing effort and corresponding landings towards Nephrops by 
reducing cod and pollack landings by circa 50% and doubling Nephrops landings, 
however keeping it still lower than the TAC. As a result the private benefit of the fleet 
remained more or less unaffected. 
 Assigning a higher value to the shadow value of biomass resulted in a great loss 
in social benefit, indicating that a valuable future resource was harvested for the sake 
of an ephemeral private benefit. The increase of enforcement effort costs had an 
insignificant contribution to the overall negative social benefit. 
  
 Tender specifications IPSC/2011104/07/NC | Service Contract No. 257233 | Final Report 72 of 75 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Full compliance is often set as the target for enforcement management. 
However, the high cost of enforcement is in many cases outweighing the benefits of 
enforcement when compliance reaches 100 %. In these cases, increasing the 
enforcement effort further would decrease the benefits to the society and a low level 
of violation of fisheries regulations would be considered acceptable. 
In this study, the optimal enforcement situation in terms of the choice of 
enforcement tools and its intensity appears to be very far from the current situation in 
the selected fisheries. 
Variations in the enforcement effort affect the probability of being detected 
when violating, and consequently the private cost of violation. As fishers operate to 
maximize their profit, the level of violation will decrease if expected cost of violating 
increases. The optimal level of violation (i.e. compliance) for the fisher is obtained 
when the marginal cost of violating equals the marginal benefit of violating. Naturally, 
the enforcement effort is also affecting the cost of enforcement and has to be 
deducted from the benefits brought upon by it. Thus, imposing higher sanctions when 
violations are detected represents an alternative to increasing enforcement effort. 
Both actions determine an improvement in the levels of compliance with regulations, 
but higher fines do not produce additional costs to the enforcement activity. Therefore, 
as enforcement effort is costly, the standard policy prescription should be to, as far as 
possible, increase the scale of the expected fines. However, even if fines cannot be 
increased indefinitely, the maximum social benefit can be achieved at lower 
enforcement effort and consequently lower costs when higher amounts of penalty are 
imposed. 
 Penalties are associated to each of the management tools considered in the 
simulations. Generally, an average fine per unit of violation is used to estimate the total 
amount to be paid by a fleet for its illegal behaviours. When the fisheries are managed 
by harvest control rules, the unit of violation is generally associated to the weight unit 
overcoming the limit imposed by TAC or other quotas regimes. When the management 
system is based on input control measures, the unit of violation generally coincides 
with the single infringement. The latter was the case for both case studies analysed 
herein and it was obvious that the current level of overall fines imposed is low. This can 
be attributed to: (i) the low average fine per violation; (ii) the high compliance, 
resulting in few violations detected or (iii) the very low efficiency of control means. 
 
Some criticism 
Simulations outcomes are based on quite limited empirical data and, in some 
cases, not actually verified assumptions. The main problem is related to the lack of 
empirical data which produces a wide level of uncertainty in the parameters 
estimation. Indeed, a robust estimation of the model parameters should be based on 
longer time series. Unfortunately, at the moment, the absence of a systematic 
collection of data on the enforcement activities does not ensure the availability of 
these data. 
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Epilogue 
 One of the deliverables of the project has been the production of a fully 
functioning software. This open source user friendly software allows the user to 
investigate the costs and the benefits of enforcement tools of various fisheries and 
management situations. It includes default functions but it is flexible enough to allow 
the user to introduce their own estimations, modify the parameters etc. if so wanted.  
As shown in practice, it can be implemented in the following ways:  
 as a learning/training tool for fisheries enforcement and control 
agencies that need better understanding of the principles of efficient 
enforcement;  
 as a rough design tool for exploring better enforcement systems;  
 as a guidance for budgeting decisions to argue for increased 
enforcement budgets on the basis of cost efficiency. 
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Abstract 
In many EU fisheries, and globally, fishers have an incentive to overuse marine resources. To counteract this 
problem, appropriate fisheries management systems had to be put in place, including control and enforcement strategies. 
Enforcement of EU fisheries management systems is costly relative to the gross value of landings with an estimated 150 to 
600 million Euros per annum (2-8% of the value of landings). It is likely that this budget could be more effectively used than is 
currently the case. 
Based on lessons learnt from the EU funded (FP6) research project COBECOS (COsts and BEnefits of COntrol 
strategies), the JRC decided to set up a pilot implementation in collaboration with the Swedish enforcement authorities. 
Fisheries control & enforcement theory developed within COBECOS was applied to two Swedish fisheries. The COBECOS 
software package developed in R (a free software environment for statistical computing libraries) uses as input fisheries data 
of bio-economic nature (stock size, catch, catch limits-TACs, market prices, operational costs) as well as control and 
enforcement data (control effort, enforcement cost, number of infringements, penalty levels). Through a user-friendly 
Graphical User Interface it outputs optimal levels of control at the lower costs, so that to obtain higher benefits from the 
fishery for the society.  
As shown in practice, it can be implemented in the following ways: (i) as a learning/training tool for fisheries 
enforcement and control agencies that need better understanding of the principles of efficient enforcement; (ii) as a design 
tool for designing better enforcement systems; (iii) as a budgeting tool to argue for increased enforcement budgets on the 
basis of cost efficiency. 
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